The Paths of Cement Imported from the U.S. Lead to Raúl Castro’s Granddaughter

HAVANA, Cuba. – If you search on Google about cement exports from the United States

to Cuba, the quick answer generated by AI might be that they practically don´t exist. But,

according to data published by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), by

August 2023, the United States had not only become the sixth-largest exporter overall to

Cuba. After payments totaling $366 million, poultry and pork meat, powdered milk, coffee,

and automobiles had made their way from the U.S. to the island. Additionally, among a

wide range of smaller merchandise shipments, one notable entry is a cement import worth

$5,870.

Just under $6,000 in cement over a year is not enough volume to suggest an active

“cement trade” between the United States and Cuba, since it represents only about 35

metric tons, based on the average product prices in the U.S. market over the past five

years. In fact, this figure is almost insignificant when compared to the thousands of tons

Cuba imports annually from countries like Panama, Canada, Spain, Germany, Turkey, or

Colombia.

All of this is happening while Cuba’s domestic cement production continues to decline

each year, now falling below 250,000 tons—less than half of what was produced in 1959,

and less than 40% of the levels reached in the early 1990s after the fall of communism in

Eastern Europe.

Still, those few tons of cement Cuba bought from the U.S. in 2023 are enough to confirm

that the product is indeed among Cuba’s imports, despite the apparent “restrictions” of the

U.S. economic embargo.

Therefore, at least one U.S. entity sold, exported, and shipped the cargo, and one Cuban

company (whether state-owned, joint venture, foreign, or from the so-called “private

sector”) purchased the material. Multiple sources directly involved in cement imports to

Cuba have said that it’s possible to import larger quantities at lower costs from

neighboring countries (also from Europe and Asia), but the quality of U.S.-produced

cement is superior. Another advantage is that from the U.S., it can be imported as parcel

delivery, not necessarily as cargo.

In fact, this is not the first time that some quantity of U.S.-produced cement has ended up

in Cuba.

An active official from the Office of the Historian of Havana, who spoke to CubaNet on the

condition of anonymity for fear of losing their job, confirmed that during the restoration and

modification of a mansion in Vedado—now home to the Fidel Castro Center—special

cement and related materials were imported from the United States specifically to ensure

the quality of certain construction elements. The import, carried out as parcel delivery via

a shipping agency to Cuba, took place in mid-2019, and the center was inaugurated in

November 2021.

“That time, we were able to do it with the support of  ‘groups of friends ‘”; the source

confirms, adding: “We did it through Apacargo S.A.”. This is a company that ships to Cuba

based in Miami, with branches in other cities in Florida. As a strategy to circumvent the

embargo, this company had previously been used by Eusebio Leal to send artworks,

vehicles, and various materials to Cuba, “destined both for the historic district and for

other unrelated matters,” the same consulted official emphasizes.

Owned by Cuban-American Eduardo Aparicio, Apacargo Express was founded in

Panama in 2010 and later was established in the United States. It is the company facing

the fewest restrictions from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)—in April

2023, it received a second OFAC license for the shipment of tractors, trucks, trailers, and

agricultural equipment—and is the fastest at getting shipments into Cuban ports. The

company promotes itself as the first exporter of medical equipment to Medicuba without

using third countries, thanks to its direct connections with Cuban entities such as

Transcargo, Aerovaradero, Aerogaviota (all under the GAESA military group), and with

the Customs and Freight Agency Palco, which is part of the Council of State.

But, what happened to the nearly 6,000 tons of cement imported by Cuba from the U.S. in

2023?

Although CubaNet confirmed that a significant portion of the cement shipment brought to

the island via Apacargo Express—delivered to the Container Terminal (TC, by its Spanish

acronym) of the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED, by its Spanish acronym)—was

linked to the Office of the Historian as an intermediary or official (but not final) recipient,

the 2023 import was unrelated to the earlier, smaller shipment used for the Fidel Castro

Center. However, according to sources involved in the handling of the shipment, this

cement was connected to the repair and construction projects carried out by members of

the dictator’s family, using funds from the so-called Local Development Projects (PDL, by

its Spanish acronym), which were financed through 2024 by the Swiss Agency for

Development and Cooperation in Cuba.

The U.S.-origin cement was used in the renovation of at least two commercial spaces for

small “private businesses,” as part of a Local Development Project (PDL) sponsored by

the municipal governments of Playa, Plaza de la Revolución, and Old Havana. That

initiative likely expanded fraudulently to include the construction, renovation, and

expansion of at least two homes in the Siboney neighborhood—one of which is occupied

by the owners and tenants of the aforementioned commercial properties.

Who Imported the Cement from the U.S. and for What Purpose?

Due to the lack of more recent data—and after a thorough review of over a hundred online

sales groups and websites of importing and commercial companies on the island, both

state-run and private—it can be concluded that none of the cement currently sold in

Cuba’s formal or informal markets, in physical stores or online, comes directly from the

United States. This suggests that the tons referenced by the Observatory of Economic

Complexity for 2023 are another exception, similar to the case in 2019.

However, over the last two months (April and May 2025), CubaNet has found two

wholesale sales advertisements—which, according to information from the Mariel Special

Development Zone (ZED), were not finalized—from companies claiming they can import

containers of cement from the U.S., in whatever quantities the client needs, within a short

timeframe and at extremely low prices, especially when compared with imports from

Panama, the Dominican Republic, Turkey, Vietnam, and Spain.

Still, the general consensus among Cuba’s most active distributors and sellers, many of

whom were interviewed directly for this report, is that such a quantity of cement directly

imported from the U.S. has not been seen in the Cuban domestic market in at least the

past five years. While 35 tons may seem small in terms of international trade, it is

significant in the Cuban context, where most domestic commerce occurs in the informal

market, made possible by the withdrawal of inventory from both state and non-state ports

and warehouses.

Thirty tons is roughly the equivalent of one container of cement. Berto H., a construction

materials seller in the alternative market, explains, “That’s like 1,000-something bags,”

and emphasizes that he hasn’t seen that cement being sold on the street.

So, what happened to those 35 tons of U.S. cement imported in 2023? Who actually

imported them, and for what purpose? Why was the Office of the Historian used to make

the purchase?

CubaNet confirmed —via sources linked to the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED),

and more specifically to the Container Terminal (TC)— that, according to customs records,

two shipments of U.S. cement, each in a 20-foot container, arrived in Cuba between

February 12 and 24, 2023. The cargo remained in the terminal until March 10, when it was

finally cleared by the General Customs of the Republic and released to the following

recipients: Antonio D. Chang, from Puerto Carena Construction Company, part of the

Office of the Historian of Havana; and María de la Caridad Sánchez, from the Provincial

Construction Company, under the Ministry of Construction (MICONS, by its Spanish

acronym), but subordinated to the Havana City Government.

The imports were made in the names of individuals, but all signs suggest that the cement

and customs duties were covered by the state companies they represented, according to

sources linked to the Office of the Historian and the provincial government of Havana.

These sources also identified the final beneficiaries as several private enterprises in the

capital. These businesses are allegedly supported by municipal governments as part of

“Local Development Projects (PDL)”, which served as justification for the use of state

funds.

The majority of these funds came from the Swiss Agency for Development and

Cooperation in Cuba, which remained active until 2024, when the management of

European funds was transferred to the so-called Platform for Articulated Territorial Integral

Development (PADIT, by its Spanish acronym), now entirely controlled by the Cuban

regime.

“There were multiple issues — with the Swiss funds, with the PDLs set to benefit, and with

the channels to make it all happen,” explains Tamara Fundora, a former official of the

Havana provincial government and someone previously involved in managing the funds.

“Due to the embargo, neither the government nor the Office of the Historian can carry out

the transaction — much less a person with OFAC-sanctioned family members. So, it had

to be done through an individual in the U.S. acting privately, which means someone ends

up benefiting from part of that money. That’s the only reason — the only reason — the

cement was brought in from the U.S.”

“Also,” Fundora adds, “not just by agreement, but by policy, the funds couldn’t be handed

directly to the selected PDLs. They had to be channeled through an organization

recognized by the Swiss, in this case, the Office of the Historian.” She further explains that

the justification for the cement import was its use in a restoration project, although it

ultimately ended up — under the same PDL program — being used for the rehabilitation

of three spaces: one in the Plaza municipality (now occupied by the Gaia Market on F

Street), and two others in the Old Havana and Playa municipalities, all part of Gaia’s PDL.

“These were the ones who requested the cement to be imported from the U.S.,” Fundora

says. “Again: this allowed the embargo conditions to justify transferring the funds from

person to person. It’s money moving from one place to another without much oversight.”

“If it had been purchased in Panama, for example, it would’ve had to be done through an

importer and with legal entities involved,” notes the ex-official, who now lives abroad.

“That didn’t suit the people who chose this scheme, because it’s easier to hide within it —

and that’s what they wanted — because they are who they are.”

Gaia Market: The “Local Development Project” of Raúl Castro’s Granddaughter

Between March 28 and April 3, 2022, the Provincial Government of Havana and PADIT

co-hosted the First Local Development Fair at ExpoCuba.

Under the slogan “In local development, WE ALL COUNT,” several business initiatives

and “private” ventures that had received Swiss Fund financing via PADIT were

showcased. Among them was Gaia, which at that time was just an emerging PDL,

registered in the names of Lisa Titolo Castro and her partner, Frank Camilo Yanes

Maures, an economics graduate from the University of Havana.

However, Lisa and Frank Camilo’s names do not appear in any records linking them to the

U.S. cement import in 2023, which ultimately enabled the restoration of the location that

houses Gaia Market. Since 2019, both Lisa’s mother Mariela Castro Espín and her

grandfather Raúl Castro Ruz, have been sanctioned by OFAC for “their involvement in

serious human rights violations”. For this reason, it would have been difficult for Lisa to

use her real name to manage the cement purchase. Furthermore, by using state

institutions, she was able to finance the renovations without paying out of her own pocket.

The company, according to the Cuban Registry of Industrial Property, is registered at the

same residence shared by the young couple and the rest of the family, which includes

Mariela Castro Espín; Paolo Titolo, Mariela’s husband and Lisa’s father; and her brother,

Paolo Raúl Titolo Castro.

According to information from sources linked to PADIT and the Havana government, the

ExpoCuba fair served multiple purposes, all revolving around the regime's interest in

launching Gaia—not so much as a private venture, but as a mechanism for capturing and

diverting funds from around the world, including from international organizations such as

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These funds were managed by the

Cuban regime through the Platform for Articulated Territorial Integral Development

(PADIT).

The official fair program—still accessible on the Havana government’s website and other

affiliated digital media—highlights “Lisa Titolo” (notably omitting her second surname,

Castro) as a speaker and promoter of Gaia, which was being presented for the first time

after having just transitioned from a Local Development Project (PDL).

Just four days before the ExpoCuba fair opened, on April 24, 2022, Lisa Titolo and Frank

Camilo Yanes Maures received official approval of their project as a “small business”— a

mipyme— (enterprise no. 2,555), according to public records of new mipymes and non-

agricultural cooperatives (CNA, by its Spanish acronym) held by the Ministry of Finance

and Prices.

Among the 138 ventures approved that same day, only three (two in Havana and one in

Cabaiguán, Sancti Spíritus province) were registered as PDLs—Gaia was one of the lucky

ones.

Furthermore, among the 8,000+ mipymes and CNAs catalogued up to 2024, only 140 had

PDL status, a designation that grants numerous benefits, including access to PADIT funds

and significant tax breaks. This supports the theory that many of these projects were

fraudulently created by the regime to siphon funds received from various governments

and international organizations through development cooperation programs.

Between 2019 and 2022, Cuba reportedly received an average of $350,000 annually from

the UNDP, according to reports published by the organization. This amount adds to

millions more received from other organizations and primarily European governments, all

intended for Local Development Projects (PDLs) and other public policy-related

programs—including more than $30 million from the UN for initiatives tied to “gender

equality.” Given how Cuba’s institutional system is structured, those funds go directly to

regime-run institutions, such as the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC, by its Spanish

acronym) and the National Center for Sexual Education (CENESEX, by its Spanish

acronym), the latter led by Mariela Castro, Lisa Titolo’s mother.

Due to the lack of publicly accessible official documentation, even though information

about PDLs and their beneficiaries should be public, CubaNet has interviewed individuals

involved in managing PDLs as profitable businesses for the Cuban regime.

Marcelo Rodríguez, a former official with the Ministry of Finance and Prices and an expert

on schemes involving PADIT as a channel for the misappropriation of funds, asserts that

Gaia, far from being a genuine business—despite its public-facing appearance as a

market—is actually just one of “many holes” through which millions in development aid to

Cuba are drained.

“The PDL scheme goes back way before the whole mipymes wave—it started in the late

1990s, alongside increased European cooperation,” Rodríguez explains. “And it fit them

like a glove again when the Swiss cooperation funds, which ended in 2024, were replaced

by PADIT, which now manages all other funds.” “They [the regime authorities] have to

report to those governments and organizations, of course, and they’re required to show

results. But it’s a theatrical production—and when you see that behind a PDL (and there

aren't many), there’s someone like the daughter of Mariela Castro or the grandson of Fidel

Castro, then you’ve uncovered a backdoor through which they shamelessly extract those

funds,” says Rodríguez, an opinion that is echoed by other sources consulted.

A PADIT specialist, interviewed for this report under condition of anonymity, confirmed

that the creation of Gaia as a Local Development Project (PDL) and its later registration

as a private small business had the clear purpose of diverting funds, including to the

United States. From there, not only cement has been imported—often using institutions

like the Office of the Historian, or the privileges granted to private entrepreneurs, and

often hidden behind front persons—but also a wide range of goods: food, beverages,

cars, motorcycles, and appliances. Once these arrive at the port, they are sold through

various channels, including the informal market, or used for personal consumption.

“Between the creation of Gaia as a PDL in 2022 and its approval as an mipymes, only

days—hours—transpired,” said the PADIT specialist. “Gaia didn’t just happen to coincide

with the First Local Development Project Fair—the business and the event were launched

together. It was a fair created exclusively for Gaia, even if it seemed like just another

venture among many.”

“By then, the new scheme for the funds was already being set up, and many of the

government officials and international representatives who visited Cuba during those days

were looking to support the private sector. So, they were shown exactly what they wanted

to see. But the true goal was always to channel those dollars and euros—which couldn’t

go where the Cuban government didn’t want them to—through regime-controlled

pipelines. And a significant portion of that money—not just Gaia’s—has ended up in Miami

or in personal bank accounts through these import operations, which aren’t always tied to

any real company. Everyone with a business in Cuba knows merchandise moves better in

the black market than behind a store counter.”

In Cuba, ventures labeled by the regime as “Local Development Projects (PDL)” are major

recipients of foreign aid and funding, and they benefit from various subsidies for their

operation. These subsidies draw on state budget resources and local territorial

contributions. As a result, they pay much lower taxes than mipymes and non-agricultural

cooperatives without PDL status. They're also exempt from customs fees on imports that

local governments deem necessary for investment and development.

Gaia, the company owned by Lisa Titolo Castro, isn’t just the family-run store located at

1st and F Streets in El Vedado, officially inaugurated in late September 2023. Gaia SRL,

registered in April 2022 with the purpose of “commercializing agricultural food products

and derivatives,” is now a far-reaching and ambitious project, no longer “local” in any

meaningful way. It has expanded into other businesses, many also classified as PDLs.

According to testimonies from employees of companies allegedly subordinate to Lisa

Titolo Castro or her family who were interviewed by CubaNet, Gaia may employ more

than 100 workers, spread across several operations, including: a meat processing center

in Guanajay, Artemisa province (under Don Padrón, a mipyme registered on April 8,

2022, listed as a PDL and registered under another name, number 2,834), It also controls

two microenterprises for construction and materials sales, including imported cement,

namely G.A.O. Construcciones SRL, located in the Plaza municipality, and Constructora

Winlanho, in the Boyeros municipality. Both are PDLs, registered on April 14, 2022, with

registration numbers 2,939 and 2,944, respectively.

According to staff at these entities, Gaia also controls two farms (one in the Santa Fe and

another in La Lisa municipalities) that officially belong to the Ministry of the Interior, and

where the workforce comes from prison labor. These farms span around 60 hectares,

used for crops and livestock. Their products are reportedly destined for foreign currency

sales, tourism, and exports, and also supply retail and wholesale points in Havana and

other provinces. There’s also an online retail platform and a miscellaneous goods

warehouse in Playa, located at the same address as Gaia’s official business registration.

To the business empire of Raúl Castro’s family must be added the well-known El Biky

restaurant and pastry shop, located at the corner of Infanta and San Lázaro Streets in

Central Havana. Though multiple sources agree it belongs to Mariela Castro, it is officially

managed by a front person.

In fact, the business model used by Raúl Castro’s granddaughter—which absorbs foreign

funds, international aid, and state budget contributions, all under the guise of community-

focused development—is a replica of the fraudulent strategy sustaining institutions like

CENESEX, run by Mariela Castro.

CubaNet attempted to make contact via phone and email with individuals associated with

these businesses in order to verify the information obtained from sources within the

provincial governments where the ventures are located. However, none of the people

contacted agreed to answer the questions sent by this outlet, with the exception of one

individual identified as Jorge Luis Cuello, who stated he was a “sales agent” for G.A.O.

Construcciones SRL. He claimed the company had no physical headquarters and said he

did not know whether the business was owned by Lisa Titolo.

A review of the social media profiles of some of the business owners, partners, and

associates connected to Gaia, Lisa Titolo Castro, and Frank Camilo Yanes Maures,

shows that they all share mutual friends.

Italian businessman Paolo Titolo, Lisa Titolo Castro’s father, is the representative in Cuba

of the Amorim Group, a company belonging to one of the wealthiest families in Portugal,

which has been involved in scandals of fraud, corruption, and money

laundering—particularly those tied to Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan

president José Eduardo dos Santos, whose fortune was built on the appropriation of

public resources.

In mid-2017, as a representative of Amorim, Paolo Titolo signed agreements with the

Portuguese Ministry of Tourism during the visit of its top official to Havana. At that time,

according to official Cuban media, agreements were made to grant scholarships in the

European Union, allegedly to train Cuban tourism personnel connected to Amorim’s

businesses in Cuba, which the group manages in partnership with GAESA, overseeing

more than a dozen hotels.

A few years before the signing of that scholarship agreement, in 2000, Américo

Amorim—owner of the Amorim business group and a close friend of the Castro

family—had been accused of document forgery, fraud, and embezzlement of funds from

the European Social Fund. The European Union demanded repayment retroactive to

1987, due to the fraudulent use of funds intended for “professional training” between 1985

and 1988. Therefore, any resemblance between the Gaia scheme and the misuse of

funds for PDLs is not a mere coincidence.